In the landscape of application ecosystems, today's cloud users wish to personalize not only their browsers with various extensions or their smartphones with various applications, but also the various extensions and applications themselves. The resulting personalization significantly raises the attractiveness for typical Web 2.0 users, but gives rise to various security risks and privacy concerns, such as unforeseen access to certain critical components, undesired information flow of personal information to untrusted applications, or emergingly new attack surfaces that were not possible before a personalization has taken place.
In this paper, we propose a novel extensibility mechanism which is used for implementing personalization of existing cloud applications towards (possibly untrusted) components in a secure and privacy-friendly manner. Our model provides a clean component abstraction, thereby in particular ruling out undesired component accesses and ensuring that no undesired information flow takes place between application components -either trusted from the base application or untrusted from various extensions. We then instantiate our model in the SAFE web application framework (WWW 2012), resulting in a novel methodology that is inspired by traditional access control and specifically designed for the newly emerging needs of extensibility in application ecosystems. We illustrate the convenient usage of our techniques by showing how to securely extend an existing social network application.
INTRODUCTION
In times of massive and still increasing use of web resources, platform-independent Rich Internet Applications (RIAs) are considered of high importance. Called Software as a Service (SaaS), these kind of applications are often database-driven and predominantly make high demands on their underlying technology. Today's Web 2.0 users wish to personalize their devices and applications -from minorly invasive customizations (such as changing the visual appearance) to functionality-extending changes that constitute true forms of extensibility. Not only smartphones, tablets, and browsers are in focus of personalization, but also existing RIAs should be customizable -and even extensible -in previously unforeseen directions [3, 31, 12, 34, 15, 18, 22, 17] .
Such user-driven personalizations (sometimes interchangeably referred to as customizations) inhabit extensible app ecosystems for web components and influence the content, the style, and the functionality of interactive web systems: the welcome page of Amazon.com shows different items for Alice as compared to Bob (content), an aged user might wish to have a larger font size for displaying text on his tablet or desktop computer (style), while a teenage user might long for advanced features to publish media data from any smartphone application to Facebook without waiting for her OS provider to support the desired features (functionality). Customization of content and style was traditionally referred to as personalization in the literature [14, 35, 17] . However, with the advent of Web 2.0, extensibility of functionality has become a novel and the most challenging component in the area of personalization.
One of the central difficulties of realizing extensibility is to faithfully address the various security and privacy aspects that naturally arise when functionality is extended in a userdriven manner. While customization of content and style usually imposes no security vulnerabilities, extensibility of functionality, i.e., the incorporation of new program components into an existing environment, faces -apart from the following functional issues -also a number of securityrelated issues.
(1) Functional contracts between the existing and the new components have to be met. Consider for example an address book component CA that exposes phone numbers to communication components such as Skype. A specified personalization could require the address book component CA to interact with a particular communication component CC that might be introduced to the systems by virtue of extensibility. Functional contracts ensure that the data exchange format of both interfaces of CA and CC match, e.g., CC needs to determine not only which global data exists in the environment of the address book, but also in which format the data is accessible. Moreover, CC should have a way to integrate its own data structures.
(2) Security guarantees have to be ensured for the entire composed system: (a) Information flow / privacy: users want to have credible guarantees that their personal data is properly protected, they should not be divulged to potentially untrusted applications or untrusted extensions of existing applications that were previously considered trustworthy. The access control policies for the data of the existing address book component CA should correctly and securely be specified when accessed by the additionally integrated communication component CC. Other components should securely access data that has been imported by CC due to the extensibility. (b) Integrity: users wish to trust the integrity of information they get provided, i.e., no malicious user should be able to interfere in the communication in a way that alters the result in an unforeseen or potentially harmful manner. (c) New attack vectors: the goal is to augment extensibility with general security mechanisms that prevent situations in which the extensibility opens new attack surfaces. Security is even harder to achieve when new components are integrated from untrusted and thus potentially malicious sources. Although software bugs might lead to security holes in a larger composed system, the chances for an attacker to introduce malicious components are much higher in open and extensible environments.
Existing customization frameworks, such as [13, 15, 34, 19, 18, 8, 6, 33, 10, 9] , are not suited for our purposes: first, they do not target security, but solely concentrate on providing proper functionality; second, they strive for customization rather than for true extensibility. We need abstractions for app ecosystems in which the users can create, share, and install third-party apps through an "app store", thereby creating new applications with enforced security properties.
Contributions. In a nutshell, this paper provides a novel mechanism for secure extensibility in the field of secure web application development. More precisely, this paper makes the following points.
(C1) Isolation/Separation. In order to address the aforementioned security challenges, we propose a novel abstraction for controlling access to principal data with a clear separation for multiple principal dimensions. Our model is inspired by traditional access control models; however, given the nature of Web 2.0 with extensibility demands, our model additionally captures the features of multi-dimensional granularity to support arbitrary context-aware personalizations and functional extensions. We provide an instantiation of our model that establishes enforced data separation in two dimensions: for users and components of an extensible app ecosystem. This two-dimensional instantiation provides automatic annotation of data items to pave the way towards flexible runtime delegation of privileges and accountability management.
(C2) Sharing/Wiring. Furthermore, in order to share data across component/user boundaries, we propose a wiring methodology to establish explicit data flows between separated app ecosystem components with explicit control over the actual data flow. To this end, we have revised the hierarchical activation model of a recently proposed web application framework [31] by a more sophisticated explicit information flow model for app ecosystems. Although the activation model nicely corresponds to the hierarchical structure of HTML web pages, personalization in terms of true extensibility requires to move on to a model that allows for data flows beyond the information propagation along the edges of the hierarchical data structures proposed in [31] .
(C3) Implementation. We have implemented our new extensibility mechanisms in [31] , which is a suitable choice for our methodologies since the framework originally laid the foundation for subsequent extensions towards secure extensibility. However, the existing extensibility mechanisms have some architectural drawbacks, e.g., all application data is globally managed by a centralized and trusted entity that enforces access control policies over the data. This notion of global data, however, does not fully capture the flavor of our extensibility model and is hard to handle from a security perspective. The deficiencies have been addressed to provide more flexibility and enforcement mechanisms to incorporate the security properties of our model.
(C4) Showcase. Finally, in order to illustrate the convenient usage of our techniques, we demonstrate how to securely extend an existing social network application by an incremental search functionality that nicely integrates into the previously existing environment.
Outline. Section 2 provides background information on traditional access control mechanisms, and it recaps the basics of the underlying framework. Section 3 introduces the abstraction model for our new mechanisms (C1, C2). Section 4 presents an implementation of our mechanisms (C3). Section 5 shows the efficacy of our extensibility approach (C4). Section 6 mentions additional related work and Section 7 concludes.
BACKGROUND
This section provides background information about traditional access control mechanisms and recaps the basics of the SAFE activation framework [31] .
Access Control Mechanisms
Traditional access control mechanisms consider the user of a dataset in order to accept or reject an operation on this particular dataset. By this means, a trusted entity keeps track of ownerships that allow for enforcing appropriate boundaries. For example, a trusted entity can be the filesystem on a multi-user desktop computer, which prevents unintended cross-user file access. Figure 1a shows a scenario in which Alice cannot access Bob's home directory, and vice versa.
Likewise, boundaries across applications are enforced through sandboxes that prevent a particular application from accessing data in the scope of another application in a common environment. As example, a common multi-application scenario that is suited for deploying such a sandbox is the encapsulation of application-specific data on contemporary smartphones [1] : In Figure 1b , the camera software of a smartphone (component C1) shall not access data stored on behalf of the address book (component C2).
Both concepts have to be combined to achieve extensible and data-driven access control mechanisms for the recent trends in cloud applications [37] , in which multiple users interact with so-called mashup applications [13] composed of multiple disjoint software components: It is insufficient to solely implement per-user access control; data access has to be additionally restricted to particular software components. Since third-party software must generally be considered untrusted, both boundaries have to be enforced centrally and simultaneously -we cannot assume any component to properly and consistently implement user-based access control for itself. Figure 1c depicts the separation of data into two realms, namely per-user and per-component. Consequently, the central access control mechanism for any data entity e has to consider at least the tuple (uid , cid ), which can be regarded as the fixation of two different access control dimensions.
Beyond access control on the basis of two distinct dimensions, one needs to consider extensibility, modularity, and personalization, which are crucial properties of modern RIAs. Usually, these properties imply the possibility of users who may want to share their own data and particular applications that may have to jointly operate on the same datasets, e.g., imagine Alice wants to share her music files with Bob; likewise, GPS data may be used in both the camera software component and the address book component. The resulting need for well-defined interaction amongst users and/or software components suggests the possibility of weakening the data separation requirements in either one dimension, thereby increasing the degrees of freedom beyond a fixed user or component.
Existing access control approaches are usually single-dimensional. By canonically embedding multiple dimensions to a single dimension, e.g., by trivial enumeration of all tuple permutations, one might lose efficiency and thereby also granularity (see below). A proper reconciliation of more than one dimension is required to provide a clean methodology for the design of future access control policies for app ecosystems.
Moreover, existing approaches with advanced access control capabilities are not well-suited for modern web application engineering: Due to the increased expressivity, approaches such as JIF [24] or strongly typed languages [36, 11, 16] usually require explicit annotation, which turns out to be cumbersome and thus barely used in heterogeneous environments formed by independent developers. It is hence necessary to automatically enforce centrally defined access control policies rather than relying on user-annotated code.
The SAFE Activation Framework
The SAFE activation framework [31, 30] is a web application framework with unified handling of common techniques largely used by today's RIAs (HTML, CSS, SQL, and JavaScript). SAFE is designed for a modularized structuring of web applications into features, facilitating extensibility by third-party customizations. The modularization is achieved by dividing a web application into semantically coherent features that are provided by functional self-contained pieces of code, the so-called f-units.
For performance reasons, a web application modeled in SAFE maintains a persistent database connection with essentially non-restricted permissions. The application itself (or its developer team) is hence responsible for maintaining wellsuited privileges of its users and for enforcing appropriate security policies such as access control, information flow, privacy, anonymity, and more.
However, due to SAFE's open environment with possibly untrusted f-units, at least the access control policies should be enforced by a central and trusted entity in order to prevent arbitrary data access of potentially malicious f-units. The trusted entity should provide a generic and secure interface for defining access policies that reflect the database semantics as intended by the developers: each f-unit must be able to rely on the enforcement of the access control policies that are stated along with the corresponding f-unit's database tables. Such policies should be flexible enough to support the ability of extending an application in unforeseen directions.
FORMAL APP ECOSYSTEM MODEL
This section details a new extensibility concept, presents a formal model thereof, and provides an instantiation of the model tailored to the needs of extensible app ecosystems.
Notation. A common term in the context of access control is the notion of principals. Principals are usually constraint to users within a system. Throughout this paper, however, by a principal we denote any first-class object for which an access control policy may be applied (e.g., an authenticated user, an installed software component on a smartphone, or a specific physical location around a company's headquarters). A principal may possess and manage its data. A principal class is a set of principals with structurally similar properties (e.g., users, software components, devices, locations). We sometimes refer to the various principal classes as principal dimensions. By ℘(X) we denote the power set of a set X.
A Novel Security Extensibility Concept
The major challenge in defining a suitable principal model for extensible app ecosystems is to develop an abstraction that satisfies at least the following requirements.
(1) The abstraction must take into account the simultaneous interplay of multiple dimensions (a user U runs a software component C on a device D at some physical location L, etc.). Such an interplay was not important before the advent of app ecosystems, e.g., traditional browser security with extensible plug-ins dealt with only a single user who operates with multi-component web applications. The security mechanism of an extensible web application, however, has to take into account various dimensions such as multiple components and multiple users. (2) The abstraction must focus on efficient reasoning for all fields in the cross product of multiple dimensions. App ecosystems naturally constitute multi-dimensional principal grids in which every principal class exists in combination with any other principal class. An ubiquitous access control policy must comprise each cell in the grid. For each item of the cross product ranging over all dimensions, a meaningful and efficient policy must exist. The policy should be concise and transparent since an embedding of each dimension to single-dimensional traditional access control policies would not only be cumbersome to maintain, but might also introduce security flaws due to the increased complexity of the embedding. (3) Extensibility requires the integration of contextual information in the process of deciding access control. Dependencies between components and users require context-aware reasoning methods in which the context is expressed in terms of a dimension, or by the presence of information provided by a principal. For example, owning a certificate might allow a user to access certain data of a component. Such certificates can be introduced through extensibility mechanisms and thereby make the access control mechanisms highly dynamic. Privileges should not be restricted to (static) binary decisions (privilege to read data: yes/no), but instead should take into account an extensible environment with information from multiple dimensions to allow for more fine-grained and conditioned policies.
Some of the aforementioned requirements resemble traditional access control abstractions; others have to be tailored to the specific needs of extensible web development. Traditional abstractions for access control (user-based, role-based, etc.) were tailored to different purposes and are thus constraint to single dimensions (users, roles, etc.). In the single dimension, only users are considered first-class citizens; software components are no first-class objects. Consider, for instance, a UNIX file system in which Alice's home directory has the permissions rwx (i.e., read, write, and execute) for the owner Alice (cf. Figure 1a ). There is no way of specifying that a particular software component -in this case some executable UNIX file -may access Alice's home directory, while another component may not. The reason is that components are running on behalf of users and thus have the same user privileges. However, components should be treated independently from users, so that individual access control can be specified in order to deny access to possibly malicious components (malware, worms, and viruses). Moreover, in traditional role-based access control settings, every component would maintain a list of roles whose users are allowed to access the component's data. In the file system example, every file or directory belongs to a group of users. Adding a user to a system requires to carefully check the user's memberships in the groups of users. Adding a user to a non-transparent group might grant unintended privileges to the user.
These considerations culminate in a novel abstraction that is particularly tailored to the emerging paradigm shift in modern web applications. The abstraction allows for efficient reasoning and maintaining the partially conflicting requirements. The strong forms of extensibility, and in particular the inter-functionality operation with their mutual conditions and environmental dependencies, require novel methods that can be efficiently deployed and maintained. More precisely, in our model, any data item may have an individual access control policy for every principal in every dimension. All principals are thus first-class citizens that inhabit the environment of an extensible web application.
In particular, any principal class can be extended at any point in time by new principals, e.g., users can be created, software components can be added, new hardware devices can be set up, and new physical locations can be explored. Context-awareness is modeled as part of the extensibility: the integration of a new component into a system allows for data integration and the establishment of links to existing components. This process is referred to as wiring. A wiring does not only make data flows between components explicit, but also introduces credentials to state properties about the actual environment. A credential stated by component C1 might for instance certify that Alice and Bob are friends, and hence Bob might read Alice contact list which is maintained by a different component C2. Moreover, our model provides unique ownerships in all dimensions which can efficiently be inferred by the currently operating component by the unique position in the grid. As a side product, we believe that this might help in establishing accountability properties whenever necessary. Furthermore, our abstraction contains the concept of sharing which is based on wirings and ownerships. The goal of sharing is to provide a reliable mechanism for enabling explicit information flow across the boundaries of principals.
Multi-Dimensional Principal Model
We consider the n-dimensional universe P n of principal classes
that subsumes all instances of the particular class Pi, e.g., users, components, locations, and so on. Furthermore, we define the data storage as the set of all data items D. Each such item is required to have a unique owner principal in each dimension, which would be affected by an operation on the particular data item. More precisely, for each data item d ∈ D, we define affP i : D → Pi to represent the affected principal in dimension i. The affected principals may be determined with arbitrary semantics, according to the operation type, information flow, inference prevention, etc. We thus stay as general as possible here in order to permit a wide range of possible subsequent instantiations. For instance, items in WHERE clauses of SQL queries or timing information in the analysis of side-channels can be captured if desired.
In order to access data items, a principal can issue a request r ∈ R. We define a method scopeD : R → ℘(D) that determines the scope of data items for such a request, i.e., the set of affected data items per request.
As motivated in Section 2, we want to enable sharing between principals of the same dimension, e.g., user Alice wants to share her favorite music files with user Bob. We thus require a sharing function shP i for each dimension Pi
to decide whether a sharing from one principal to another is defined for a specific data item.
Finally, the main access control policy req valid : R × P1 × . . . × Pn → {0, 1} decides whether a given request is valid for all principals associated with this request (issuers). More specifically, a request is considered permissive if for each affected principal pi, we have that either pi is the issuer itself, or that pi has explicitly shared the requested data with the actual issuer.
req valid (r , p1 , . . . , pn ) :⇔ ∀d ∈ scopeD (r ) :
Example. Consider a set of users U and a set of software components C in a web application as an instantiation of two different principal classes, such that P 2 = U, C . If component c ∈ C issues a request r ∈ R on behalf of user u ∈ U, then r is considered permissive if one of the following conditions holds for all affected data items d ∈ scopeD(r ):
No sharing: affU (d ) = u and affC(d ) = c, i.e., the request only accesses data that is in the scope of both u and c.
Cross-C sharing: Cross-U sharing: affU (d ) = u ′ for some u ′ = u, affC(d ) = c, and the user u ′ has shared the requested data with user u, i.e., shU (u ′ , u, d).
Cross-U,C sharing:
′ for some c ′ = c, and user u ′ as well as component c ′ have both shared the requested data with c running on behalf of u, i.e., shU (u ′ , u, d) and shC(c ′ , c, d).
Instantiation for App Ecosystems
We show how to instantiate the generic model into a concrete existing model. This instantiation constitutes a general role model for extensible app ecosystems. We will later refine this model to become a specific improvement of the SAFE framework. We concentrate on two dimensions and create two principal classes: authenticated users and software components. Furthermore, we show how to incorporate common relational database models within our instantiated model. Furthermore, we show a wiring methodology to implement sharing between components by establishing links between the database tables owned by the particular components.
Let us reconsider the example of a multi-user web application with extensible components, which instantiates P 2 = U, C as principal universe to constitute the set of users and software components that are present in the system.
Tables and Affected Components. We assume the data storage to be reflected by a standard relational database model. By regarding all data items of D on the granularity of database rows, data items can be grouped according to a set of database tables T . Database tables hence establish a relation between requests R and concrete data items D:
t).
The data storage model consists of local tables lt : C → ℘(T ) that hold the actual data owned by a component. Moreover, there is a notion of input tables. Input tables subsume data items which are explicitly provided by other components by means of sharing. Access control policies might impose restrictions on sharing the actual data of an input table according to the user who is accessing the data. Input tables are therefore instantiated for a particular user id:
it : C × U → ℘(T ) We assume that there is no data item that cannot be accessed by either a local table or an input table: ∀d ∈ D : (∃c ∈ C, t ∈ lt(c) : d ∈ data(t)) ∨ (∃c ∈ C, u ∈ U, t ∈ it(c, u) : d ∈ data(t)) As the overall content of an input table t ∈ it(·, ·) may be provided by multiple components, the providing component of a particular retrieved data item d ∈ data(t), i.e., the source src : D → C, constitutes the affected component for access on an input table:
∀t ∈ it(·, ·), d ∈ data(t) : affC(d ) := src(d ) For access on local tables, the affected component is the associated component c ∈ C itself:
Owners and Affected Users. In order to determine the affected user of any access on any data item d ∈ D, we require the presence of an owner mapping own : D → U to be automatically stored with the data item. The retrieval of the owner information could for example rely on a unique identifier mapping or a particular owner column for each data item. By assuming a proper owner information management for both local tables and input tables, we instantiate the affected user accordingly:
Sharing. The goal of sharing is to provide a reliable mechanism for enabling explicit information flow across the boundaries of principals, thereby enforcing various dynamic confidentiality policies. In an extensible app ecosystem, we assume that every persistently stored data item might be processed arbitrarily by a component before ultimately reaching the particular local Due to the limited gain and the anticipated problems of a restriction directly on local tables, we allow a component c to have full access to its local tables for all users. We hence assume for all local tables t ∈ lt(c),
Making local tables public in their component's scope does not introduce potential information leakages or security vulnerabilities, since components do not gain any additional knowledge. In addition, the potential leakage or abuse of information has to be considered anyhow by the user before providing sensitive data to a particular component.
Similarly, a user has to rely on the access control of the providing component in which datasets might be included in an input table. Thus, given component c ∈ C and user u ∈ U, we assume for all input tables t ∈ it(c, u),
By the definition of an input table t, all data items d ∈ data(t) are intentionally shared on behalf of the providing component src(d ). Hence, for all input tables of component c ∈ C running in the scope of user u ∈ U, we assume ∀t ∈ it(c, u), d ∈ data(t) : shC(src(d ), c, d ) By Equations (1) and (2), we basically incapacitate the user by shifting the sharing responsibility solely to the component dimension -in contrast to the requirement that both dimensions have to agree on a sharing of a particular data item. However, a component can only share datasets that it was explicitly provided with by either the dataset's owner or by another sharing component. We can regard both cases as the implicit affirmation of the user based on his personal trust assessment for potential sharing in a manner the component may specify on own behalf.
Overall Sandbox. Using the previously introduced predicates, we propose an instantiation of the formal model that we call sandbox. The sandbox sb discriminates a particular request according to common operations in relational database systems:
op : R → {SEL, INS, UPD, DEL} Here, op is defined to restrict a single request to a single operation, while this is not necessarily the case in practice, e.g., an update operation UPD might incorporate a select operation SEL when updating data that was previously read or evaluated according to some condition. However, we assume op(r ) to be well-defined for all r ∈ R -if necessary, r has to be split up into sub-requests.
We define the sandbox sb : R × U × C → {0, 1} according to the following semantics: sb(r , u, c) → if op(r ) ∈ {INS, UPD, DEL} : ∀t ∈ scopeT (r ) : t ∈ lt(c)
∧ ∀d ∈ scopeD(r ) :
∀t ∈ scopeT (r ) : t ∈ lt(c) ∨ t ∈ it(c, u)
Intuitively, a modification request {INS,UPD,DEL} is considered permissive if it operates only on own local tables (3A) and if all affected datasets are owned by the authenticated user (3B). A select request {SEL} is considered permissive, if it operates only on own local tables or on input tables (3C).
Soundness. In order to show that the presented sandbox semantics is a valid instantiation of the previously introduced formal model, i.e., the sandbox indeed reflects that for every dimension, either own or explicitly shared datasets are affected, we have to prove the soundness of our instantiation with respect to the formal model. More precisely, it has to be shown that sb(r , u, c) ⇒ req valid (r , u, c), i.e., that the sandbox is at least as restrictive as the model. The implications of the sandbox semantics immediately entail this statement without further proof obligations.
Component Wiring Model
One of the major features and challenges of today's datadriven and reactive web applications -in particular of SAFEis to ensure server-client consistency. If a component modifies the state of the database, the changes should be reflected by its dependent components and their visual presentation and also by the instances of the components at the client. In SAFE, any component (referred to as f-unit) can activate other components: act : C → ℘(C) Upon an activation initiated by a component c, activation data is passed from c through the particular activation interfaces of act (c). The behavior of the activated child component instances thus depends on the state of the parent component c. Consequently, the set act(c) is possibly datadependent of c.
Components generate HTML content that is enclosed by a particular node in the DOM tree of the HTML page. Components and their activations hence constitute a hierarchical, cycle-free structure, the activation tree:
Due to the activation data dependencies, each change in a component's data realm possibly outdates some components in the corresponding subtrees of Gact .
The concept of sharing introduces an additional possibility of receiving data such that propagation of changes is not necessarily fully reflected by the edges of the activation tree. This additional data dependency imposed by our sharing mechanism is covered by the combined graph G comb = Vact , Eact ∪ E sh that includes edges representing the presence of an input table from one component to another:
The definitions of both Eact and E sh can be considered as an over-approximation since they do not respect the extent of the actually changed data -their combination, however, clearly captures all possible dependencies.
Using the combined graph, we can determine and update components that rely on stale data. If a local table of a particular component c changes due to a modifying query, the transitive closure starting at c contains all potentially stale components that should be considered for updating. For the combined graph, we determine a topological component ordering, which takes the partial orderings as defined by the particular dependencies into account. The global topological ordering is well-defined, as wirings and/or activations that would result in a cycle are rejected at first place, and thereby ensures that the rebuilding step propagates on yet refreshed data. Using the partial ordering, the order of required activations and thus components to be rebuilt can be determined -in other words, all components are rebuilt in an order such that all data requirements are satisfied. The freshly generated content is merged into complete subtrees of the activation tree (and thus also into the DOM tree). Finally, the rebuilt content is pushed to stale client browser instances.
IMPLEMENTATION
We present the implementation of the major parts of our model instantiation in the SAFE framework. More specifically, the semantics of the sandbox formalism (Equation 3 and its components 3A, 3B, 3C) relies on the following insights as introduced below:
(3A) Permissions for INS, UPD, and DEL operations are only granted on local tables. In addition, the query sandbox (explained below) ensures that a component can only access its own local tables. (3B) According to the owner invariant (explained below), before each modifying operation, MySQL triggers verify an owner column of the particular row according to the authenticated user. (3C) Permissions for SEL: as for (3A), the query sandbox ensures only own tables (whether local or input table) are accessible via SELECT queries.
For automatic database management, an f-unit may provide an SQL-style .db-file, which declares the tables (local, input, output) of the particular f-unit. In the following, we present chosen aspects of the parsing, validation, and interpretation of the .db-file during the f-unit integration process. We assume the deployment of the widely used open source database MySQL version 5.1. Furthermore, due to space constraints, we omit technical details whenever possible. Examples are contained in Section 5.
Owner Invariant. We consider a data modification attempt as authorized only if the operation either adds a new dataset with valid user information or modifies (or deletes) a dataset that was created on behalf of the same user before. By this means, we satisfy both separation in the user dimension (as required by the formal model) and the own(·) validation (as required by part (3B) in our instantiation). As this approach requires keeping track of the creating user and the extent of each dataset, we require each datasetmore technically, each row of a table -to hold an owner column.
In order to ensure accountability, owner-preserving integrity invariants are defined as transition constraints for each modification operation on the basis of owner column values: The owner column of the dataset to be inserted, updated, or deleted must match the authenticated user the f-unit is currently connected to. In addition, the owner column must not change due to an update operation.
For implementing these requirements, MySQL's trigger concept [25] is a suitable choice. Before each particular operation, a trigger inspects a column's pending new and old value (where appropriate) by the NEW or OLD pseudo-table, respectively. In addition, direct access to a column value avoids the need for parsing the query string and thus reduces the risk for the check of being bypassed. Figure 2 shows an UPDATE trigger that ensures both requirements of our stated invariant by raising an error if the value of the owner column would either change or cannot been validated against the connected user. The purpose and semantics of the function verify_uid(), its arguments, and the variable @uid are derived in the following.
In order to let a trigger verify our stated owner invariant, the user u known at SAFE's centralized reference monitor (CRM) must be made available to the trigger in a flexible though authentic way. When relying on the fact that there is a single database connection per CRM and a single CRM per f-unit processing lifetime, we assume a single database connection per f-unit and user. This allows the usage of a connection-specific MySQL session variable [29] to pass the current user u along to the trigger with each query. After establishing the connection to the database, the CRM thus sets the following session variables, using the f-unit name funit, a secret key sk , and a cryptographic hash function H:
Before the query is executed, the verify_uid() function in the trigger of Figure 2 is thus able to compare @uid_h with the outcome of its own hash computation using @uid. The included sk inside the hash of @uid_h prevents an f-unit from creating valid hashes for arbitrary users on its own, as the sk is only available to the CRM and hard-coded in the trigger. Consequently, no f-unit should be granted the TRIGGER or SUPER privileges [27] . The funit string ensures that even in case the @uid_h is leaked, the security impact is limited to the scope of the particular f-unit and user.
Each table stated in a .db-file is hence forced to specify exactly one owner column. This convention allows for the creation of appropriate triggers that verify this particular column against the @uid variable that was set by the CRM prior in the connection -and thereby enforce the invariants as specified above.
Query Sandbox. Apart from data separation in the user dimension, the formal model requires a clear data separation between components -more technically, our formal model requires an explicit assignment between tables and f-units, and the prevention of any cross-references. We thus have to ensure that incoming queries only access tables in the scope of their originating f-unit.
In order to prevent clashes in the table namespace, every stated table in an f-unit's .db-file is prefixed with the name of the defining f-unit. For the sake of a convenient usage and a clear interface, we do not expose the prefixing to the developer -instead, the CRM replaces each encountered table in a received query on-the-fly by its prefixed counterpart.
As each f-unit has to authenticate itself at the CRM before placing queries, the f-unit can be determined reliably. Accessed tables are hence enforced to be permissive according to the particular connected f-unit -the table prefixing thus prevents data access across f-unit boundaries and thereby implements the query sandbox.
In fact, the prefixing approach can be considered as the transformation of a global, shared database towards a local, per-f-unit database. The security of the prefixing approach solely relies on the robustness of the replacing algorithm. The presented prefixing-based sandbox approach satisfies the needs of our formal model with respect to crosscomponent data access prevention.
Wiring. Due to the limitation of f-units to access only their associated tables using the query sandbox, we considerably lose flexibility, as cross-f-unit collaboration via the database is prevented -in contradiction to the extensibility paradigm of SAFE. We hence have to provide a sharing implementation using input tables (cf. Section 3.3). We need well-defined interfaces for exchanging data across f-unit boundaries, while preserving all integrity and confidentiality constraints.
In order to receive arbitrary data, f-units declare input tables with a table-like signature. Output tables implement SELECT statements for providing such datasets, allowing f-units to decide on their own, which data shall be exposed. Figure 3 (left-hand side) shows an example of an f-unit providing user groups, in which each public group with its owner is exposed. A statistics f-unit (right-hand side) can receive data items of various types. As the representation of the data in the providing f-unit does not necessarily match the intended signature of the input tables, we do not want to limit the power of an output table in collecting its information from other tables. Therefore, arbitrary queries are allowed in the specification of output tables. However, as with all other f-unit queries, output table queries are automatically table-OUTPUT TABLE a Figure 3 : Example: Defining input and output tables in an f-unit's .db-file.
prefixed and thus restricted to the boundaries of the source f-unit. Implemented as a VIEW, an output table's signature (column names and types) can be determined reliably after creation using MySQL's information_schema.columns table [28] . Together with the definitions of input tables, we can provide full signatures of both input and output tables to a new step in the integration process, the wiring.
A wiring matches an input table schema to an output table schema, yielding a particular mapping that is internally expressed as a SELECT statement. An input table view can thus be represented by a UNION, which allows to combine multiple mapping statements -an approach in data integration terms usually referred to as global-as-view [21] . Each of those input table-and wiring-specific output table queries form a schema matching that follows syntax and semantics as defined by the input table. There exist several schema matching techniques that could be used for automatically deriving input/output table correspondencesthese techniques are still prone to mistakes, suggesting at least a human-aided approach [5] . However, we leave further improvements of the wiring process between input and output tables, such as an algorithm-aided schema matching, for future work. Upon integration of an f-unit, the human integrator is presented the list of all input and output tables and may connect their particular columns after reviewing types and semantics (cf. Figure 5 ).
Foreign Keys. The goal of input tables is not only to provide the functionality of collecting data for presentation, but instead, also to extend existing datasets according to the functionality of an f-unit -by linking own data to received entries. As an example, consider an f-unit managing particular objects (images, groups, profiles, . . . ), while a wired child f-unit provides some per-user functionality on top of each parent object (comments, votes, . . . ). This 1:1 or 1:N dependency can be expressed as values in a local table that are explicitly referencing a value in another local table or even in an input table. Upon deletion of the referenced value, all referencing entries that have become stale are implicitly deleted in order to ensure consistency between both involved tables, e.g., if an image has been deleted, all associated comments are deleted as well. MySQL's concept of foreign key constraints [26] can be used only for involved tables being "real" tables. However, we want to support foreign keys on input tables, which are implemented as a UNION over the column-mappings to arbitrarily crafted output tables. We thus implemented a generic custom approach in order to emulate foreign key semantics with increased flexibility. Using MySQL triggers, our approach keeps track of dependencies between local tables even through wired input and output tables, and ensures consistency by detecting and deleting rows that have become invalid. Such child rows are not necessarily owned by the user who is deleting the parent object. The operation might hence violate the owner invariant. We have provided an explicit handling for such well-defined cases.
Wiring Invariants. By the presence of a wired input table, we assume that its content was intentionally shared by the providing source f-unit, as required by the formal model instantiation. However, an input table should possibly be restrictable to a particular user.
As example, assume an f-unit F that provides the functionality of friendships between users. While friendship information might be valuable for other components, e.g., for an f-unit that provides some messaging feature, each particular dataset of the corresponding output table of F shall only be accessible for either one of the involved users. This intuition reflects that a user who provides some information to F has to trust F in implementing appropriate access control, whether in the scope of business logic or output tables.
We thus introduce a deviant output table syntax to incorporate the possibility of expressing additional invariants for each output table. As in Figure 4 , the invariant of friends_o uses the session variable @uid, the built-in predicate is(), and the logical operator OR. The invariant holds true if the @uid matches either the owner or friend column of the row to be read. In particular, consider the output table friends_o being wired into an input table of a malicious f-unit F ′ . Due to the invariant of friends_o, F ′ would gain knowledge of all friends of a particular user u only if u used F ′ once. In other words, F ′ has no access granted to u's datasets until activated in the scope of u's @uid. Unless overridden by explicit invariant specification, the default behavior of output tables assumes the invariant is(@uid,owner) and thereby protects any private data in general.
Dynamic Predicates. As all information an f-unit might refer to is available by either local tables or by input tables, an f-unit may specify an invariant using tables as predicates. If the particular f-unit considers friendship information retrieval to be permissive for friends of either one involved party, the invariant could be stated as is ( @uid , owner ) OR friends ( @uid , owner ) OR is ( @uid , friend ) OR friends ( @uid , friend )
for friends being a table with binary arity. Likewise, for ignores being an input table or a local table, an invariant consisting of its negation ! ignores ( owner , @uid ) AND ! ignores ( friend , @uid ) hides datasets for users who are ignored by some of the affected users.
For the verification of invariants, the wiring provides an additional view that selects from the actual (unrestricted) output table. The restricted view of the output table includes a WHERE condition that is derived from the whole invariant expression, e.g, from the predicate tbl(x0, . . . , xi):
EXISTS ( SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE p0 =x0 AND ... AND pi =xi )
The implementation of invariants containing negation or wildcards is analogous.
The existential quantifier semantics with conjunctive matching allows for easy deployment in common environments in which access control bases on group memberships, permissions, and/or user relationships. As predicates can even refer to input tables, the wiring process provides the flexibility and modularity needed for incorporating extensions at runtime -knowing the input table's column semantics is sufficient for an f-unit to state senseful invariants.
EXAMPLES AND EVALUATION
We illustrate how to conveniently extend an existing application with new functionality, based on the previously introduced techniques. More specifically, we take a SAFE application of an interactive social network and add an incremental search functionality composed of a set of independent f-units.
Initial Application. In addition to various other features, the initial social network application comprises the common functionality of group memberships that are implemented by an f-unit Groups. Any authenticated user may create a group, which can be joined by other users. As f-units are required to state appropriate output tables for the sake of extensibility, Groups provides the public output table all_groups with a declaration of data and an invariant: The output table exposes the group names to the wiring process: If wired, other f-units can access the names of all groups. The invariant ALL makes the group information public, i.e., readable for every user, and thus for every @uid.
Furthermore, an f-unit Messaging implements an instant messaging functionality and defines an output table private_msgs as the set of all messages (local table conversations) that can be associated with the current user:
OUTPUT TABLE p r i v a t e _ m s g s ( SELECT msg_id AS key , msg , uid_from AS owner , uid_to AS to FROM c o n v e r s a t i o n s I N V A R I A N T is ( owner , @uid ) OR is ( to , @uid ) )
Per default, every user may access output table rows with a matching owner column is(owner,@uid), see Section 4. However, the specified invariant replaces this default behavior by potentially allowing foreign f-units to access both sent and received messages of the particular user they are currently connected to.
Adding Functionality. Given the initial application, we now want to add a common incremental search functionality. By this means, the f-unit LiveSearch monitors a text input field for typing events, searches all its available datasets for the input pattern, and displays matching rows. As introduced in Section 4, we have equipped LiveSearch with an input table data that can be wired to output tables of other f-units. The input table has two main data fields: text for arbitrary textual content (e.g., chat messages, group titles, poll descriptions), and type for an informal description of the search source type (e.g., messages, groups, polls). By virtue of this input table, LiveSearch is able to search arbitrary data sets -even for data sources that are provided by f-units that were not known before, or by f-units that might come up in the future. At runtime, LiveSearch compares these data sources with the search patterns entered in LiveSearch's search input field:
INPUT
< input type =" text " name ="search" id =" s e a r c h F i e l d" > LiveSearch issues queries against its input table data for every keyup-event of the search field and activates corresponding instances of the f-unit LiveSearchResults:
< activate : L i v e S e a r c h R e s u l t s query =" SELECT text AS result , type AS info FROM data WHERE '$#search ' < > ' ' AND LOWER ( text ) LIKE LOWER ( CONCAT ( '% ' , REPLACE ( '$#search', ' ', '% ') , '% ' ))" refresh =" s e a r c h F i e l d. keyup " / > The activation tag in the code snippet above is part of SAFE's modeling language SFW, an extended HTML-based declarative programming language that allows for concise incorporation of HTML constructs, JavaScript events, and SQL queries.
In the social network setting, the search engine shall include the groups of the social network in its search results. In order to provide LiveSearch with the actual group names, the wiring of Groups.all_groups into LiveSearch.data maps key → key, name → text, the constant 'Group' → type, and owner → owner. Furthermore, upon integration of Messaging, the new feature of searching in both sent and received messages can be stated by the wiring shown in Figure 5 : key → key, msg → text, the constant 'Message' → type, and owner → owner. Evaluation. Figure 6 shows the resulting application: a wired input table allows LiveSearch to display search results generically for datasets of both Groups and Messaging. The wiring of Groups.all_groups and Messaging.private_msgs into LiveSearch.data results in a safe setting that reflects the modularity and extensibility paradigms, as depicted above. The implementation of LiveSearch benefits from various features and concepts that are offered by the described extensions of SAFE. For instance, the result set of LiveSearch can be arbitrarily augmented at "run-time", and the wiring allows for easy integration of new functionality into an existing app ecosystem, without affecting already established apps. Collaboration across f-units thus only relies on a sufficiently generic interface of all involved f-units, formed by input and output tables. Furthermore, LiveSearchResults -or any other involved f-unit -can be replaced by means of extensibility with respect to both presentation and functionality, allowing for augmenting the application in unforeseen directions. In addition, even though Messaging publishes privacy-sensitive data, Messaging is able to bind datasets to appropriate invariants and thus has full control over which data might possibly be presented to other users. Consequently, the impact of an extended malicious f-unit (for instance LiveSearch) on the overall system security is limited to the abuse of the malicious f-unit's very own or received datasets. Finally, SAFE's activation tag <activate..> with the attributes query and refresh allows for a straight-forward implementation without the need for cumbersome user-defined AJAX handling -the resulting gain is a high functionality/LoC ratio with all its implied desirable correctness and security properties.
RELATED WORK
In addition to the related work mentioned throughout the paper, we emphasize the following web application frameworks and related them to our contributions. Similar to SAFE, the WebRatio development environment [2, 7] , and, in particular, the WebML language [9] , follow the approach of building web applications by composing and connecting so-called content units. These units are modeled and structured by means of an abstract, data-centric description and thus strongly resemble data dependencies as well as the actual data representation layout. Our focus, however, is to address the possibility of incorporating third-party code, which requires the presence of appropriate security mechanisms. SMash [20] addresses the task of combining data and code from different origins in standard (i.e., unmodified) browsers based on HTML iframes. The system establishes secured communication channels between the different components. However, there is no unified database support for the different components, and there is no enforced principal model as required in the case of data-driven applications with sensitive user data, ownership and provenance. Instead of presenting an iframe-based implementation, we provide a novel multi-dimensional privilege model suitable for extensible mashup applications. Moreover, in contrast to [20] and also [23, 4] , our model does not assume different origins per each integrated component. Technically, the origin is defined by the triple scheme/servername/port. Instead, untrusted code is integrated on a single server that delivers all necessary code at once. As in our model, the ServiceOS operating system [37] considers web application components (as well as desktop applications) as first-class principals. Multi-application sharing is brought to web applications with cross-principal protection and resource management. The approach is different in that our approach directly augments the developed applications with functionality and security, instead of providing an operating system. In particular, applications in our model run in every standard browser and thus do not require a certain environment to be installed at the client side.
CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a novel extensibility mechanism which is designed for the implementation of extensibility for existing cloud-based web applications. Possibly untrusted components can be integrated in an app ecosystem in a secure and privacy-friendly manner. Our multi-dimensional principal model provides a clean component abstraction, thereby impeding undesired component access and ensuring that no undesired information flow takes place between application components. We have instantiated our model in the SAFE activation framework, resulting in a novel methodology that is specifically designed for the newly emerging needs of extensibility in application ecosystems. We have illustrated the convenient usage of our techniques by showing how to securely extend an existing social network application.
